Elections in Turkey: the choice between democracy and dictatorship – Interview with Şebnem Oğuz

Şebnem Oğuz is a retired professor of political science from Ankara, Turkey. She received her PhD Degree in Political Science from York University, Canada. Her research interests include state theory, political economy, Marxism and Turkish politics. She is a member of the Socialist Register Editorial Collective and has published in various journals such as Science and Society, Political Geography, Socialist Register and Praksis. Currently she is a member of Ankara Solidarity Academy and the Advisory Board of HDP, a left-wing party known for its support of the rights of the Kurdish population. Ahead of the May election 14^th, she talked to in about the situation in Turkey

What can you say about the situation in Turkey and the social and political dynamics on the eve of the election?

First of all, I should say that we are dealing with the destructive consequences of the deep transformation of the political regime towards what I would call a new type of Islamic fascism and the extreme impoverishment of broad sections of society under twenty-one years of AKP rule. On top of all this came the loss of over 58, 000 lives in the recent earthquake, which, as many critics have rightfully argued, is a political disaster rather than a natural one. That’s why majority of people in Turkey are fed up with the AKP regime and want a real change in the upcoming elections. However, this will not be as easy as it has been the case with countries like the US and Brazil. Trump and Bolsonaro had to accept defeat after a short period of opposing the election results because they did not stay in power for a period of time to adequately organize and take root in all state institutions. However, Erdogan has remained in power for more than twenty years, created its own bourgeoisie, formed its paramilitary forces, redesigned the army, judiciary, media and other state institutions. He has successfully managed the transition from the previous power bloc based on Western-oriented big capitalists that grew in the early years of Kemalist regime to a new power bloc of emerging Islamic capitalists oriented towards countries like Qatar, Russia and Azerbaijan. This transition was accompanied a deep change in the state apparatuses whereby the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) became a prominent institution with a huge budget and personnel, making political interventions in all areas of social life. In the meantime, Turkish state has turned into a war machine that spent nearly 20% of its budget on military activities, becoming a warring state that reproduced the conflict in Eastern Turkey with the Kurdish population and conducted numerous cross-border invasions of Syria in the last four years.

All this transformation gained new dimensions after AKP’s formation of the “People’s Alliance” with the ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and BBP (Great Unity Party) in 2018. This alliance not only deepened the Islamic fascist character of the regime but also enhanced formal and informal coalitions with ultranationalist gangs, mafia leaders and paramilitary forces. On the eve of 2023 elections, two more Islamic parties have joined the alliance: HUDAPAR (Free Cause Party) and YRP (New Welfare Party). HUDAPAR is a Kurdish Islamist party which has its roots in the armed Hezbollah group (not the Lebanese Shi’a organization by the same name), who is responsible for the murder of hundreds of people including Kurdish dissidents, rights defenders and journalists in the 1990s. It is called «Hezbo-contras» over the role it played in state forces’ operations involving extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. HÜDAPAR has Sharia-minded elements in its program such as the criminalization of extra-marital relationships, expansion of single-sex education, revision of women’s working conditions to “befit their nature”. Similarly, YRP, which shares the same Islamic roots with AKP, is against LGBT rights and aims to lift a law that protects women and children against domestic violence. Therefore, this new alliance has been rightfully described as a «new type Taliban alliance” by Selahattin Demirtaş, the imprisoned former co-leader of the HDP. It is indeed the most reactionary bloc in Turkish political history, backed by various religious cults that flourished under AKP rule. If this bloc gets elected, the transformation of the political regime towards Islamic fascism will be completed. So the upcoming elections is not only about choosing parliamentary deputies and the President but choosing the political regime.

Are the tragic consequences of the earthquakes and the way they brought forward all the contradictions of the AKP era going to be a decisive factor in the elections?

 This is a difficult question. According to polls, there is a certain decline in AKP’s votes but this decline is not so much related to the mismanagement of the earthquake. There are several reasons for this. First, Turkish society has already been polarized into two camps – “two nations”- for years, and AKP is interested in consolidating its own support basis rather than increasing its votes from the other camp. So after the earthquake, AKP sent more aid to Turkish and Sunni populated areas than Kurdish and Alevi populated areas, Thus, while the government’s response to the earthquake galvanized anger among opposition voters, it did not affect core AKP voters to the same degree. Second, throughout the relief efforts, the propaganda machine of AKP government worked quite effectively in cooperation with Turkish Intelligence Agency and Diyanet to save the image of Erdogan and the regime. Display of religious slogans were used to elicit angry responses from the secularist bloc, which in turn helped Erdogan consolidate his Islamic base. Pro-AKP news channels presented Jihadist organizations and Islamic cults as NGOs fighting against the earthquake, as those who pulled  people out of the wreckage alive saying Allahuekber (while in fact the rescuers were other volunteers)  Also, anti-migrant politician Ümit Özdağ, leader of the far-right Zafer (Victory) Party was mobilized with the goal of channeling public anger to Syrian and other migrant groups who were accused of  looting in areas affected by the earthquake. Finally, Erdogan promised that cities would be rebuilt in a year through a reconstruction drive. This promise not only convinced his voters that only Erdogan could restore their lives to pre-quake normality, but also secured the support of pro-AKP capitalists as the reconstruction plans would serve further wealth transfer to them.

To what extent the economic situation, inflation, unemployment are going to play a role?

 I think they are going to play a very significant role, maybe more than the earthquake. However, AKP government has been trying to take measures to prevent this. Some of these measures involve populist economic support mechanisms. For instance, the age requirement for retirement was lifted for those who started employment before 1999, which means 2 million and 250 thousand citizens will have the right to retire. Increase in the minimum wage, public employee salaries and pensions, amnesty of interest on student loans, inexpensive housing scheme for first-time home buyers, cheaper credit for businesses are other mechanisms of this kind. However, these measures are not enough to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis. So AKP government is increasingly resorting to two major ideological mechanisms. First is the narrative of “Century of Turkey” (major slogan of Erdogan’s election campaign) which emphasizes glorious “domestic and national” technological achievements such as the country’s “first domestically produced electric car” TOGG (which in fact largely depends on foreign companies for some of its essential parts), Turkey’s first amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu, etc. AKP leaders argue that these developments are more important than the declining purchasing power of masses. A recent example is quite telling in this regard. In response to the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s complaints about  the tremendous increase in the prices of onion, some AKP and MHP leaders arrogantly said: “While we are concerned with our nation’s glorious projects like TOGG, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, new natural gas in the Black Sea, etc., the opposition is concerned with trivial issues like the price of onion”. I believe this strategy cannot be effective in containing the anger of masses. However, there is another ideological mechanism, which I think might be effective on religious people: the  Diyanet fetwas which legitimize poverty and inflation with statements such as «poor people are closest to God», «God will test believers with fear and hunger, with a decline in their lives and belongings, but God will award the patient ones at the end», ‘It is only Allah who sets prices, gives hardship and abundance, and provides for”, etc. These fetwas serve to consolidate AKP voters while at the same time produce more anger on the secular opposition forces. The response of people living in the countryside and those living in big cities might also differ. AKP votes in the countryside might not decline that much, as people living there are more conservative and open to Diyanet fetwas. But there might be more decline in AKP votes in three big cities, Ankara İzmir and İstanbul. This is because AKP used to say that social assistance will drop if CHP wins local elections. To the contrary, municipal aid in these cities has increased since CHP won elections in 2019, so people feel that they are not dependent on AKP for survival.

Do you think that a rejection of Erdogan’s authoritarian style of governance is going to be evident in the election? 

If elections were held in a free and secure environment, Erdogan’s authoritarianism would definitely be a major factor in his defeat. Polls show that the votes of Kilicdaroglu and Erdogan are still close, but Kılıcdaroglu’s votes are bit higher. So, under normal conditions, we would expect Kilicdaroglu to win the presidential elections (maybe in the second round because Muharrem Ince will split the votes) and the opposition parties to win the majority of seats in the parliament. However, there are important barriers against this. First among them is concerns about election security. We know that only 450,000 of the over 2 million voters who left the earthquake-zone are registered. But 1 million 626 thousand voters did not register as the deadline set by YSK (Supreme Election Council) was too close. So, they have to go back to their cities in the earth-quake zone in order to vote on the Election Day. This is risky as it is quite difficult to reach those cities after the quake. There are also concerns that names of people who were lost in the earthquake can be used as voters for AKP. YSK’s ruling against marking voters’ fingers with indelible ink during the voting process increases this risk. Furthermore, ballot boxes will be established in 15 new countries like Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria and Pakistan, where maintaining election security might be quite difficult. And most importantly, the Supreme Election Council and its provincial organizations are not impartial. Just to give an example, recently the President of Diyarbakır 9^th High Criminal Court, which gave heavy sentences to Kurdish politicians was made the Chairman of the Provincial Election Board there.

The second barrier is the use of violence against opposition parties. Recently buildings of CHP (Republican People’s Party), İYİP (Good Party) and YSP (Green Left Party- successor of HDP) were attacked or vandalized in Ankara, İzmir an Istanbul. These incidents might increase and create an atmosphere of fear. There are also concerns that paramilitary forces close to HUDAPAR might terrorize the ballot boxes in Kurdish provinces, districts and villages, and may even be recruited for Trump-like, Bolsonaro-like opposition in the event of AKP’s loss. And finally, Erdogan may play the usual nationalist card. It seems that the cross-border operation to be carried out in Rojava might not take place due to both the lack of international support and the great destruction in the earthquake. So, he might choose to further criminalize HDP inside (although it will enter the elections under the Green Left Party due to the risk of being closed). The recent statement by Turkish prosecution asking for 36 defendants, including former co-chairs of HDP, to be punished by aggravated life imprisonment in the extremely politicized Kobani trial might serve this purpose. Erdogan might use it in his election campaign to criminalize Green Left Party as a successor of HDP.

What aspects of social and political conflict are going to be reflected in the election? 

 21 years of AKP rule has culminated serious social and political conflicts induced by a deep transformation of state institutions, foreign policy and economic management, which are all related to AKP’s shift away from a Western-oriented power bloc to an Islamic-oriented one. Internationally, this shift also corresponds to a shift in the neoliberal model from one with rule-based institutions to another in which resources distribution is tied to «political loyalty» and informal networks of power .The three major alliances which will compete in the elections, that is, the ruling People’s Alliance (led by AKP, having vote rates of  35-45 percent), the main opposition Nation’s Alliance (led by CHP, having vote rates of  35-45 percent) and the Labour and Freedom Alliance (led by the Green Left Party, with vote rates of 10-12  percent) have different approaches to these models. The ruling People’s Alliance wants to consolidate the politicized neoliberal model based on informal networks of power whereas the Nation’s Alliance led by CHP wants to restore the neoliberal model with rule-based institutions. The Labour and Freedom Alliance rejects both models and offers a third alternative which combines anti-capitalist economic policies with a radical democracy project aiming to solve Kurdish issue through peaceful methods.

The common goal of all oppositional alliances is the overthrow of 21-year-old AKP regime. At this point understanding the amendment made in the electoral system a year ago is very important. According to the previous election law, seats were distributed to alliances in proportion to their respective voting rates and then distributed within the alliances. With the amendment, the seats will be distributed directly to the parties hence the parties in the same alliance will compete against each other. Thus, if alliances run in the election with multiple lists, the number of deputies they will win is significantly reduced. On the contrary, if they compete with a single merged list, the number of deputies increases considerably. AKP made this amendment because if this system had been implemented in the 2018 election, AKP-MHP alliance would get more seats while the CHP-İYİP alliance would get fewer seats. Accordingly, in the eve of the elections AKP wanted to merge candidate lists with MHP. However, MHP refused to do so after the new additions to the alliance. This means the People’s Alliance might end up with 15 to 20 seats less than it could win. So, we can say that AKP’s initial plan backfired. The Nation’s Alliance, on the other hand, managed to turn the system in its own advantage by creating «alliances within alliances» in electoral districts throughout the country. Accordingly, İYİP will have its own lists and candidates of the four smaller parties in the Nation’s Alliance will compete as candidates of the CHP, to switch back to their parties once elected. However, the same could not be said for Labour and Freedom Alliance composed of Green Left Party and Turkish Workers Party (TİP). The Green Left Party has its own joint list which combines candidates from HDP and its five socialist component parties with Kurdish political parties such as Kurdish Communist Party and three other Turkish socialist parties. But it couldn’t convince TİP to join this common list. TİP will field candidates separately in 41 provinces. This will mean candidates of both parties will compete with each other in some provinces, which might lead to a loss of seats for the Labor and Freedom Alliance as a whole.

The decision of HDP not to present a presidential candidate, will it help the opposition’s chances and how it is related to the party’s stated goals of increased democratization?

 HDP’s decision not to present a presidential candidate practically means supporting Kilicdaroglu in the presidential elections. This will definitely help the opposition’s chances as HDP’s 10-12 percent voting rate will be crucial for Kilicdaroglu to win the majority against Erdogan. I believe that Kilicdaroglu’s possible presidency will also help HDP’s goals of democratization. It is important to remember that Kilicdaroglu said “the address for the solution of Kurdish problem is the parliament” in his recent meeting with HDP co-chairs. Of course, Kilicdaroglu might not be able to go too far in these attempts because of his nationalist ally, IYIP. He might not be able to break up with the national security paradigm either. Still, his discourse on security has its differences from Erdogan’s. Kilicdaroglu is much more interested in border security against incoming refugees and Cihadist groups rather than cross-border operations in northern Syria. More importantly, he might take important steps towards democratization through reestablishing the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, autonomy of universities, etc. It is the duty of HDP and its allies to force Kılıcdaroglu to take further steps in this direction.

What other aspects of the conjuncture will influence the election?

 An important dynamic to be considered in the elections is how the ruling and oppositional blocs will respond to the huge wealth transfer to pro-AKP capitalists, bureaucrats and Islamic cults over 21 years of AKP rule. Kılıcdaroğlu has pledged to get back 418 billion dollars of state funds transferred from the Treasury to the “Gang of 5”, five biggest conglomerates that grew through AKP’s support in recent years. In response, Gang of 5 is alleged to have informal meetings to defeat Kilicdaroglu in the elections, while simultaneously negotiating with members of IYIP for a smooth transition in case the Nation’s Alliance wins. Similarly, AKP is doing all it can to win the elections in order to maintain these wealth transfer mechanisms and preventing lawsuits against them. At the same time, however, they are also preparing themselves for the possibility of losing power. An important step they have taken in this regard is nominating many former AKP ministers as parliamentary candidates so that they can be given immunity. Similarly, the list of MHP’s deputy candidates include the suspects of 5 political murders that will never be forgotten in Turkish political history. Concludingly, I can say that we will not have normal elections, not only in terms of the electoral process itself, but also in terms of the possible composition of the new parliament. We might see counter-guerrilla leaders and political murderers, representatives of different national and international power blocs, deputies expected to serve as “diplomats” between these blocs, former AKP ministers with immunity for their previous crimes in the new parliament. On the other hand, we hope to have numerous deputies from the Labor and Freedom Alliance who will struggle for a totally different world. There are only 30 days left but everything is still very unpredictable. Let’s hope that the elections will pave the way for a transition from dictatorship to democracy, rather than the consolidation of dictatorship.